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 1---
 2template:
 3url: efficacy-deepfakes
 4title: The efficacy of deepfakes
 5subtitle: Can we really write it off as "not a threat"?
 6date: 2020-05-11
 7---
 8
 9A few days back, NPR put out an article discussing why deepfakes aren't
10all that powerful in spreading disinformation.
11[Link to article](https://www.npr.org/2020/05/07/851689645/why-fake-video-audio-may-not-be-as-powerful-in-spreading-disinformation-as-feare).
12
13According to the article:
14
15> "We've already passed the stage at which they would have been most
16> effective," said Keir Giles, a Russia specialist with the Conflict
17> Studies Research Centre in the United Kingdom. "They're the dog that
18> never barked."
19
20I agree. This might be the case when it comes to Russian influence.
21There are simpler, more cost-effective ways to conduct [active
22measures](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Active_measures), like memes.
23Besides, America already has the infrastructure in place to combat
24influence ops, and have been doing so for a while now. 
25
26However, there are certain demographics whose governments may not have
27the capability to identify and perform damage control when
28a disinformation campaign hits, let alone deepfakes. An example of this
29demographic: India.
30
31## the Indian landscape
32
33The disinformation problem in India is way more sophisticated, and
34harder to combat than in the West. There are a couple of reasons for
35this:
36
37- The infrastructure for fake news already exists: WhatsApp
38- Fact checking media in 22 different languages is non-trivial
39
40India has had a long-standing problem with misinformation. The 2019
41elections, the recent CAA controversy and even more recently -- the
42coronavirus. In some cases, it has even lead to 
43[mob violence](https://www.npr.org/2018/07/18/629731693/fake-news-turns-deadly-in-india).
44
45All of this shows that the populace is easily influenced, and deepfakes
46are only going to simplify this. What's worse is explaining to a rural
47crowd that something like a deepfake can exist -- comprehension and
48adoption of technology has always been slow in India, and can be
49attributed to socio-economic factors. 
50
51There also exists a majority of the population that's already been
52influenced to a certain degree: the right wing. A deepfake of a Muslim
53leader trashing Hinduism will be eaten up instantly. They are inclined
54to believe it is true, by virtue of prior influence and given the
55present circumstances.
56
57## countering deepfakes
58
59The thing about deepfakes is the tech to spot them already exists. In
60fact, some can even be eyeballed. Deepfake imagery tends to have weird
61artifacting, which can be noticed upon closer inspection. Deepfake
62videos, of people specifically, blink / move weirdly. The problem at
63hand, however, is the general public cannot be expected to notice these
64at a quick glance, and the task of proving a fake is left to researchers
65and fact checkers.
66
67Further, India does not have the infrastructure to combat deepfakes at
68scale. By the time a research group / think tank catches wind of it, the
69damage is likely already done. Besides, disseminating contradictory
70information, i.e. "this video is fake", is also a task of its own.
71Public opinion has already been swayed, and the brain dislikes
72contradictions.
73
74## why haven't we seen it yet?
75
76Creating a deepfake isn't trivial. Rather, creating a _convincing_ one
77isn't. I would also assume that most political propaganda outlets are
78just large social media operations. They lack the technical prowess and
79/ or the funding to produce a deepfake. This doesn't mean they can't
80ever. 
81
82It goes without saying, but this post isn't specific to India. I'd say
83other countries with a similar socio-economic status are in a similar
84predicament. Don't write off deepfakes as a non-issue just because
85America did.