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10 September, 2019
Disinformation demystified
Misinformation, but deliberate
As with the disambiguation of any word, let's start with its etymology
and definiton. According to [1]Wikipedia, disinformation has been
borrowed from the Russian word -- dezinformatisya (dezinforma'ciya),
derived from the title of a KGB black propaganda department.
Disinformation is false information spread deliberately to deceive.
To fully understand disinformation, especially in the modern age, we
need to understand the key factors of any successful disinformation
operation:
* creating disinformation (what)
* the motivation behind the op, or its end goal (why)
* the medium used to disperse the falsified information (how)
* the actor (who)
At the end, we'll also look at how you can use disinformation
techniques to maintain OPSEC.
In order to break monotony, I will also be using the terms "information
operation", or the shortened forms -- "info op" & "disinfo".
Creating disinformation
Crafting or creating disinformation is by no means a trivial task.
Often, the quality of any disinformation sample is a huge indicator of
the level of sophistication of the actor involved, i.e. is it a 12 year
old troll or a nation state?
Well crafted disinformation always has one primary characteristic --
"plausibility". The disinfo must sound reasonable. It must induce the
notion it's likely true. To achieve this, the target -- be it an
individual, a specific demographic or an entire nation -- must be well
researched. A deep understanding of the target's culture, history,
geography and psychology is required. It also needs circumstantial and
situational awareness, of the target.
There are many forms of disinformation. A few common ones are staged
videos / photographs, recontextualized videos / photographs, blog
posts, news articles & most recently -- deepfakes.
Here's a tweet from [2]the grugq, showing a case of recontextualized
imagery:
Disinformation.
The content of the photo is not fake. The reality of what it
captured is fake. The context it's placed in is fake. The picture
itself is 100% authentic. Everything, except the photo itself, is
fake.
Recontextualisation as threat vector. [3]pic.twitter.com/Pko3f0xkXC
— thaddeus e. grugq (@thegrugq) [4]June 23, 2019
Motivations behind an information operation
I like to broadly categorize any info op as either proactive or
reactive. Proactively, disinformation is spread with the desire to
influence the target either before or during the occurence of an event.
This is especially observed during elections.^[5]1 In offensive
information operations, the target's psychological state can be
affected by spreading fear, uncertainty & doubt, or FUD for short.
Reactive disinformation is when the actor, usually a nation state in
this case, screws up and wants to cover their tracks. A fitting example
of this is the case of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 (MH17), which was
shot down while flying over eastern Ukraine. This tragic incident has
been attributed to Russian-backed separatists.^[6]2 Russian media is
known to have desseminated a number of alternative & some even
conspiratorial theories^[7]3, in response. The number grew as the JIT's
(Dutch-lead Joint Investigation Team) investigations pointed towards
the separatists. The idea was to muddle the information space with
these theories, and as a result, potentially correct information takes
a credibility hit.
Another motive for an info op is to control the narrative. This is
often seen in use in totalitarian regimes; when the government decides
what the media portrays to the masses. The ongoing Hong Kong protests
is a good example.^[8]4 According to [9]NPR:
Official state media pin the blame for protests on the "black hand"
of foreign interference, namely from the United States, and what
they have called criminal Hong Kong thugs. A popular conspiracy
theory posits the CIA incited and funded the Hong Kong protesters,
who are demanding an end to an extradition bill with China and the
ability to elect their own leader. Fueling this theory, China Daily,
a state newspaper geared toward a younger, more cosmopolitan
audience, this week linked to a video purportedly showing Hong Kong
protesters using American-made grenade launchers to combat police.
...
Media used to disperse disinfo
As seen in the above example of totalitarian governments, national TV
and newspaper agencies play a key role in influence ops en masse. It
guarantees outreach due to the channel/paper's popularity.
Twitter is another, obvious example. Due to the ease of creating
accounts and the ability to generate activity programmatically via the
API, Twitter bots are the go-to choice today for info ops. Essentially,
an actor attempts to create "discussions" amongst "users" (read: bots),
to push their narrative(s). Twitter also provides analytics for every
tweet, enabling actors to get realtime insights into what sticks and
what doesn't. The use of Twitter was seen during the previously
discussed MH17 case, where Russia employed its troll factory -- the
[10]Internet Research Agency (IRA) to create discussions about
alternative theories.
In India, disinformation is often spread via YouTube, WhatsApp and
Facebook. Political parties actively invest in creating group chats to
spread political messages and memes. These parties have volunteers
whose sole job is to sit and forward messages. Apart from political
propaganda, WhatsApp finds itself as a medium of fake news. In most
cases, this is disinformation without a motive, or the motive is hard
to determine simply because the source is impossible to trace, lost in
forwards.^[11]5 This is a difficult problem to combat, especially given
the nature of the target audience.
The actors behind disinfo campaigns
I doubt this requires further elaboration, but in short:
* nation states and their intelligence agencies
* governments, political parties
* other non/quasi-governmental groups
* trolls
This essentially sums up the what, why, how and who of disinformation.
Personal OPSEC
This is a fun one. Now, it's common knowledge that STFU is the best
policy. But sometimes, this might not be possible, because afterall
inactivity leads to suspicion, and suspicion leads to scrutiny. Which
might lead to your OPSEC being compromised. So if you really have to,
you can feign activity using disinformation. For example, pick a place,
and throw in subtle details pertaining to the weather, local events or
regional politics of that place into your disinfo. Assuming this is
Twitter, you can tweet stuff like:
* "Ugh, when will this hot streak end?!"
* "Traffic wonky because of the Mardi Gras parade."
* "Woah, XYZ place is nice! Especially the fountains by ABC street."
Of course, if you're a nobody on Twitter (like me), this is a non-issue
for you.
And please, don't do this:
mcafee opsecfail
Conclusion
The ability to influence someone's decisions/thought process in just
one tweet is scary. There is no simple way to combat disinformation.
Social media is hard to control. Just like anything else in cyber, this
too is an endless battle between social media corps and motivated
actors.
A huge shoutout to Bellingcat for their extensive research in this
field, and for helping folks see the truth in a post-truth world.
__________________________________________________________________
1. [12]This episode of CYBER talks about election influence ops
(features the grugq!).
2. The [13]Bellingcat Podcast's season one covers the MH17
investigation in detail.
3. [14]Wikipedia section on MH17 conspiracy theories
4. [15]Chinese newspaper spreading disinfo
5. Use an adblocker before clicking [16]this.
References
1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disinformation
2. https://twitter.com/thegrugq
3. https://t.co/Pko3f0xkXC
4. https://twitter.com/thegrugq/status/1142759819020890113?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw
5. https://icyphox.sh/home/icy/leet/site/build/blog/disinfo/temp.html#fn:1
6. https://icyphox.sh/home/icy/leet/site/build/blog/disinfo/temp.html#fn:2
7. https://icyphox.sh/home/icy/leet/site/build/blog/disinfo/temp.html#fn:3
8. https://icyphox.sh/home/icy/leet/site/build/blog/disinfo/temp.html#fn:4
9. https://www.npr.org/2019/08/14/751039100/china-state-media-present-distorted-version-of-hong-kong-protests
10. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Research_Agency
11. https://icyphox.sh/home/icy/leet/site/build/blog/disinfo/temp.html#fn:5
12. https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/ev3zmk/an-expert-explains-the-many-ways-our-elections-can-be-hacked
13. https://www.bellingcat.com/category/resources/podcasts/
14. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malaysia_Airlines_Flight_17#Conspiracy_theories
15. https://twitter.com/gdead/status/1171032265629032450
16. https://www.news18.com/news/tech/fake-whatsapp-message-of-child-kidnaps-causing-mob-violence-in-madhya-pradesh-2252015.html
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