1---
  2template: text.html
  3title: Disinformation demystified
  4subtitle: Misinformation, but deliberate
  5date: 2019-09-10
  6---
  7
  8As with the disambiguation of any word, let's start with its etymology and definiton.
  9According to [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disinformation),
 10_disinformation_ has been borrowed from the Russian word --- _dezinformatisya_ (дезинформа́ция),
 11derived from the title of a KGB black propaganda department.
 12
 13> Disinformation is false information spread deliberately to deceive.
 14
 15To fully understand disinformation, especially in the modern age, we need to understand the
 16key factors of any successful disinformation operation:
 17
 18- creating disinformation (what)
 19- the motivation behind the op, or its end goal (why)
 20- the medium used to disperse the falsified information (how)
 21- the actor (who)
 22
 23At the end, we'll also look at how you can use disinformation techniques to maintain OPSEC.
 24
 25In order to break monotony, I will also be using the terms "information operation", or the shortened
 26forms---"info op" & "disinfo".
 27
 28## Creating disinformation
 29
 30Crafting or creating disinformation is by no means a trivial task. Often, the quality
 31of any disinformation sample is a huge indicator of the level of sophistication of the
 32actor involved, i.e. is it a 12 year old troll or a nation state?
 33
 34Well crafted disinformation always has one primary characteristic --- "plausibility".
 35The disinfo must sound reasonable. It must induce the notion it's _likely_ true. 
 36To achieve this, the target --- be it an individual, a specific demographic or an entire
 37nation --- must be well researched. A deep understanding of the target's culture, history,
 38geography and psychology is required. It also needs circumstantial and situational awareness,
 39of the target.
 40
 41There are many forms of disinformation. A few common ones are staged videos / photographs, 
 42recontextualized videos / photographs, blog posts, news articles & most recently --- deepfakes.
 43
 44Here's a tweet from [the grugq](https://twitter.com/thegrugq), showing a case of recontextualized
 45imagery:
 46
 47<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" data-dnt="true" data-theme="dark" data-link-color="#00ffff">
 48<p lang="en" dir="ltr">Disinformation.
 49<br><br>
 50The content of the photo is not fake. The reality of what it captured is fake. The context it’s placed in is fake. The picture itself is 100% authentic. Everything, except the photo itself, is fake.
 51<br><br>Recontextualisation as threat vector. 
 52<a href="https://t.co/Pko3f0xkXC">pic.twitter.com/Pko3f0xkXC</a>
 53</p>&mdash; thaddeus e. grugq (@thegrugq) 
 54<a href="https://twitter.com/thegrugq/status/1142759819020890113?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">June 23, 2019</a>
 55</blockquote>
 56<script async src="https://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js" charset="utf-8"></script> 
 57
 58## Motivations behind an information operation
 59
 60I like to broadly categorize any info op as either proactive or reactive. 
 61Proactively, disinformation is spread with the desire to influence the target
 62either before or during the occurence of an event. This is especially observed
 63during elections.[^1]
 64In offensive information operations, the target's psychological state can be affected by
 65spreading **fear, uncertainty & doubt**, or FUD for short.
 66
 67Reactive disinformation is when the actor, usually a nation state in this case,
 68screws up and wants to cover their tracks. A fitting example of this is the case
 69of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 (MH17), which was shot down while flying over 
 70eastern Ukraine. This tragic incident has been attributed to Russian-backed 
 71separatists.[^2] 
 72Russian media is known to have desseminated a number of alternative & some even
 73conspiratorial theories[^3], in response. The number grew as the JIT's (Dutch-lead Joint
 74Investigation Team) investigations pointed towards the separatists. 
 75The idea was to **muddle the information** space with these theories, and as a result,
 76potentially correct information takes a credibility hit.
 77
 78Another motive for an info op is to **control the narrative**. This is often seen in use
 79in totalitarian regimes; when the government decides what the media portrays to the
 80masses. The ongoing Hong Kong protests is a good example.[^4] According to [NPR](https://www.npr.org/2019/08/14/751039100/china-state-media-present-distorted-version-of-hong-kong-protests):
 81
 82> Official state media pin the blame for protests on the "black hand" of foreign interference, 
 83> namely from the United States, and what they have called criminal Hong Kong thugs.
 84> A popular conspiracy theory posits the CIA incited and funded the Hong Kong protesters, 
 85> who are demanding an end to an extradition bill with China and the ability to elect their own leader.
 86> Fueling this theory, China Daily, a state newspaper geared toward a younger, more cosmopolitan audience, 
 87> this week linked to a video purportedly showing Hong Kong protesters using American-made grenade launchers to combat police.
 88> ...
 89
 90
 91## Media used to disperse disinfo
 92
 93As seen in the above example of totalitarian governments, national TV and newspaper agencies
 94play a key role in influence ops en masse. It guarantees outreach due to the channel/paper's
 95popularity.
 96
 97Twitter is another, obvious example. Due to the ease of creating accounts and the ability to
 98generate activity programmatically via the API, Twitter bots are the go-to choice today for 
 99info ops. Essentially, an actor attempts to create "discussions" amongst "users" (read: bots),
100to push their narrative(s). Twitter also provides analytics for every tweet, enabling actors to
101get realtime insights into what sticks and what doesn't.
102The use of Twitter was seen during the previously discussed MH17 case, where Russia employed its troll
103factory --- the [Internet Research Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Research_Agency) (IRA)
104to create discussions about alternative theories.
105
106In India, disinformation is often spread via YouTube, WhatsApp and Facebook. Political parties
107actively invest in creating group chats to spread political messages and memes. These parties
108have volunteers whose sole job is to sit and forward messages.
109Apart from political propaganda, WhatsApp finds itself as a medium of fake news. In most cases,
110this is disinformation without a motive, or the motive is hard to determine simply because
111the source is impossible to trace, lost in forwards.[^5]
112This is a difficult problem to combat, especially given the nature of the target audience.
113
114## The actors behind disinfo campaigns
115
116I doubt this requires further elaboration, but in short:
117
118- nation states and their intelligence agencies
119- governments, political parties
120- other non/quasi-governmental groups
121- trolls
122
123This essentially sums up the what, why, how and who of disinformation. 
124
125## Personal OPSEC
126
127This is a fun one. Now, it's common knowledge that
128**STFU is the best policy**. But sometimes, this might not be possible, because
129afterall inactivity leads to suspicion, and suspicion leads to scrutiny. Which might
130lead to your OPSEC being compromised.
131So if you really have to, you can feign activity using disinformation. For example,
132pick a place, and throw in subtle details pertaining to the weather, local events
133or regional politics of that place into your disinfo. Assuming this is Twitter, you can
134tweet stuff like:
135
136- "Ugh, when will this hot streak end?!"
137- "Traffic wonky because of the Mardi Gras parade."
138- "Woah, XYZ place is nice! Especially the fountains by ABC street."
139
140Of course, if you're a nobody on Twitter (like me), this is a non-issue for you.
141
142And please, don't do this:
143
144![mcafee opsecfail](/static/img/mcafeetweet.png)
145
146## Conclusion
147
148The ability to influence someone's decisions/thought process in just one tweet is 
149scary. There is no simple way to combat disinformation. Social media is hard to control.
150Just like anything else in cyber, this too is an endless battle between social media corps
151and motivated actors.
152
153A huge shoutout to Bellingcat for their extensive research in this field, and for helping
154folks see the truth in a post-truth world.
155
156[^1]: [This](https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/ev3zmk/an-expert-explains-the-many-ways-our-elections-can-be-hacked) episode of CYBER talks about election influence ops (features the grugq!). 
157[^2]: The [Bellingcat Podcast](https://www.bellingcat.com/category/resources/podcasts/)'s season one covers the MH17 investigation in detail.
158[^3]: [Wikipedia section on MH17 conspiracy theories](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malaysia_Airlines_Flight_17#Conspiracy_theories)
159[^4]: [Chinese newspaper spreading disinfo](https://twitter.com/gdead/status/1171032265629032450)
160[^5]: Use an adblocker before clicking [this](https://www.news18.com/news/tech/fake-whatsapp-message-of-child-kidnaps-causing-mob-violence-in-madhya-pradesh-2252015.html).