1---
  2template:
  3title: Disinfo war: RU vs GB
  4subtitle: A look at Russian info ops against Britain
  5date: 2019-12-12
  6---
  7
  8This entire sequence of events begins with the attempted poisoning of
  9Sergei Skripal[^skripal], an ex-GRU officer who was a double-agent for
 10the UK's intelligence services. This hit attempt happened on the 4th of
 11March, 2018. 8 days later, then-Prime Minister Theresa May formally
 12accused Russia for the attack.
 13
 14[^skripal]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sergei_Skripal
 15
 16The toxin used in the poisoning was a nerve agent called _Novichok_.
 17In addition to the British military-research facility at Porton Down,
 18a small number of labs around the world were tasked with confirming
 19Porton Down's conclusions on the toxin that was used, by the OPCW
 20(Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons).
 21
 22With the background on the matter out of the way, here are the different
 23instances of well timed disinformation pushed out by Moscow.
 24
 25## The Russian offense
 26
 27### April 14, 2018
 28
 29- RT published an article claiming that Spiez had identified a different
 30toxin---BZ, and not Novichok.
 31- This was an attempt to shift the blame from Russia (origin of Novichok),
 32to NATO countries, where it was apparently in use.
 33- Most viral piece on the matter in all of 2018.
 34
 35Although technically correct, this isn't the entire truth. As part of
 36protocol, the OPCW added a new substance to the sample as a test. If any
 37of the labs failed to identify this substance, their findings were
 38deemed untrustworthy. This toxin was a derivative of BZ.
 39
 40Here are a few interesting things to note:
 41
 421. The entire process starting with the OPCW and the labs is top-secret.
 43How did Russia even know Speiz was one of the labs?
 442. On April 11th, the OPCW mentioned BZ in a report confirming Porton
 45   Down's findings. Note that Russia is a part of OPCW, and are fully
 46   aware of the quality control measures in place. Surely they knew
 47   about the reason for BZ's use?
 48
 49Regardless, the Russian version of the story spread fast. They cashed in
 50on two major factors to plant this disinfo:
 51
 521. "NATO bad" : Overused, but surprisingly works. People love a story
 53   that goes full 180°.
 542. Spiez can't defend itself: At the risk of revealing that it was one
 55   of the facilities testing the toxin, Spiez was only able to "not
 56   comment".
 57
 58### April 3, 2018
 59
 60- The Independent publishes a story based on an interview with the chief
 61executive of Porton Down, Gary Aitkenhead.
 62- Aitkenhead says they've identified Novichok but "have not identified
 63the precise source".
 64- Days earlier, Boris Johnson (then-Foreign Secretary) claimed that
 65Porton Down confirmed the origin of the toxin to be Russia.
 66- This discrepancy was immediately promoted by Moscow, and its network
 67all over.
 68
 69This one is especially interesting because of how _simple_ it is to
 70exploit a small contradiction, that could've been an honest mistake.
 71This episode is also interesting because the British actually attempted
 72damage control this time. Porton Down tried to clarify Aitkenhead's
 73statement via a tweet[^dstltweet]:
 74
 75> Our experts have precisely identified the nerve agent as a Novichok. 
 76> It is not, and has never been, our responsibility to confirm the source 
 77> of the agent @skynews @UKmoments
 78
 79[^dstltweet]: https://twitter.com/dstlmod/status/981220158680260613
 80
 81Quoting the [Defense One](https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2019/12/britains-secret-war-russia/161665/) 
 82article on the matter:
 83
 84> The episode is seen by those inside Britain’s security communications team 
 85> as the most serious misstep of the crisis, which for a period caused real 
 86> concern. U.K. officials told me that, in hindsight, Aikenhead could never 
 87> have blamed Russia directly, because that was not his job—all he was 
 88> qualified to do was identify the chemical. Johnson, in going too far, 
 89> was more damaging. Two years on, he is now prime minister.
 90
 91### May 2018
 92
 93- OPCW facilities receive an email from Spiez inviting them to
 94a conference.
 95- The conference itself is real, and has been organized before.
 96- The email however, was not---attached was a Word document containing
 97malware.
 98- Also seen were inconsistencies in the email formatting, from what was
 99normal.
100
101This spearphishing campaign was never offically attributed to Moscow,
102but there are a lot of tells here that point to it being the work of
103a state actor:
104
1051. Attack targetting a specific group of individuals.
1062. Relatively high level of sophistication---email formatting,
107   malicious Word doc, etc.
108
109However, the British NCSC have deemed with "high confidence" that the
110attack was perpetrated by GRU. In the UK intelligence parlance, "highly
111likely" / "high confidence" usually means "definitely".
112
113## Britain's defense
114
115### September 5, 2018
116
117The UK took a lot of hits in 2018, but they eventually came back:
118
119- Metropolitan Police has a meeting with the press, releasing their
120findings.
121- CCTV footage showing the two Russian hitmen was released.
122- Traces of Novichok identified in their hotel room.
123
124This sudden news explosion from Britan's side completely
125bulldozed the information space pertaining to the entire event.
126According to Defense One:
127
128> Only two of the 10 most viral stories in the weeks following the announcement 
129> were sympathetic to Russia, according to NewsWhip. Finally, officials recalled, 
130> it felt as though the U.K. was the aggressor. “This was all kept secret to 
131> put the Russians on the hop,” one told me. “Their response was all over the 
132> place from this point. It was the turning point.”
133
134Earlier in April, 4 GRU agents were arrested in the Netherlands, who
135were there to execute a cyber operation against the OPCW (located in The
136Hague), via their WiFi networks. They were arrested by Dutch security,
137and later identifed as belonging to Unit 26165. They also seized a bunch
138of equipment from the room and their car.
139
140> The abandoned equipment revealed that the GRU unit involved had sent
141> officers around the world to conduct similar cyberattacks. They had
142> been in Malaysia trying to steal information about the investigation
143> into the downed Malaysia Airlines Flight 17, and at a hotel in Lausanne,
144> Switzerland, where a World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) conference was taking
145> place as Russia faced sanctions from the International Olympic Committee.
146> Britain has said that the same GRU unit attempted to compromise Foreign
147> Office and Porton Down computer systems after the Skripal poisoning.
148
149### October 4, 2018
150
151UK made the arrests public, published a list of infractions commited by
152Russia, along with the specific GRU unit that was caught.
153
154During this period, just one of the top 25 viral stories was from
155a pro-Russian outlet, RT---that too a fairly straightforward piece.
156
157## Wrapping up
158
159As with conventional warfare, it's hard to determine who won. Britain
160may have had the last blow, but Moscow---yet again---depicted their
161finesse in information warfare. Their ability to seize unexpected
162openings, gather intel to facilitate their disinformation campaigns, and
163their cyber capabilities makes them a formidable threat. 
164
1652020 will be fun, to say the least.