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Efficacy of deepfakes post

Signed-off-by: Anirudh Oppiliappan <x@icyphox.sh>
Anirudh Oppiliappan x@icyphox.sh
Mon, 11 May 2020 11:46:11 +0530
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| | | | :-- | --: | +| [The efficacy of deepfakes](/blog/efficacy-deepfakes) | 2020-05-11 | | [Simplicity (mostly) guarantees security](/blog/simplicity-security) | 2020-05-07 | | [The S-nail mail client](/blog/s-nail) | 2020-05-06 | | [Stop joining mastodon.social](/blog/mastodon-social) | 2020-05-05 |
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+--- +template: +url: efficacy-deepfakes +title: The efficacy of deepfakes +subtitle: Can we really write it off as "not a threat"? +date: 2020-05-11 +--- + +A few days back, NPR put out an article discussing why deepfakes aren't +all that powerful in spreading disinformation. +[Link to article](https://www.npr.org/2020/05/07/851689645/why-fake-video-audio-may-not-be-as-powerful-in-spreading-disinformation-as-feare). + +According to the article: + +> "We've already passed the stage at which they would have been most +> effective," said Keir Giles, a Russia specialist with the Conflict +> Studies Research Centre in the United Kingdom. "They're the dog that +> never barked." + +I agree. This might be the case when it comes to Russian influence. +There are simpler, more cost-effective ways to conduct [active +measures](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Active_measures), like memes. +Besides, America already has the infrastructure in place to combat +influence ops, and have been doing so for a while now. + +However, there are certain demographics whose governments may not have +the capability to identify and perform damage control when +a disinformation campaign hits, let alone deepfakes. An example of this +demographic: India. + +## the Indian landscape + +The disinformation problem in India is way more sophisticated, and +harder to combat than in the West. There are a couple of reasons for +this: + +- The infrastructure for fake news already exists: WhatsApp +- Fact checking media in 22 different languages is non-trivial + +India has had a long-standing problem with misinformation. The 2019 +elections, the recent CAA controversy and even more recently---the +coronavirus. In some cases, it has even lead to +[mob violence](https://www.npr.org/2018/07/18/629731693/fake-news-turns-deadly-in-india). + +All of this shows that the populace is easily influenced, and deepfakes +are only going to simplify this. What's worse is explaining to a rural +crowd that something like a deepfake can exist---comprehension and +adoption of technology has always been slow in India, and can be +attributed to socio-economic factors. + +There also exists a majority of the population that's already been +influenced to a certain degree: the right wing. A deepfake of a Muslim +leader trashing Hinduism will be eaten up instantly. They are inclined +to believe it is true, by virtue of prior influence and given the +present circumstances. + +## countering deepfakes + +The thing about deepfakes is the tech to spot them already exists. In +fact, some can even be eyeballed. Deepfake imagery tends to have weird +artifacting, which can be noticed upon closer inspection. Deepfake +videos, of people specifically, blink / move weirdly. The problem at +hand, however, is the general public cannot be expected to notice these +at a quick glance, and the task of proving a fake is left to researchers +and fact checkers. + +Further, India does not have the infrastructure to combat deepfakes at +scale. By the time a research group / think tank catches wind of it, the +damage is likely already done. Besides, disseminating contradictory +information, i.e. "this video is fake", is also a task of its own. +Public opinion has already been swayed, and the brain dislikes +contradictions. + +## why haven't we seen it yet? + +Creating a deepfake isn't trivial. Rather, creating a _convincing_ one +isn't. I would also assume that most political propaganda outlets are +just large social media operations. They lack the technical prowess and +/ or the funding to produce a deepfake. This doesn't mean they can't +ever. + +It goes without saying, but this post isn't specific to India. I'd say +other countries with a similar socio-economic status are in a similar +predicament. Don't write off deepfakes as a non-issue just because +America did.
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</image> <language>en-us</language> <copyright>Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 4.0</copyright> - <item><title>Simplicity (mostly) guarantees security</title><description><![CDATA[<p>Although it is a very comfy one, it&#8217;s not just an aesthetic. Simplicity + <item><title>The efficacy of deepfakes</title><description><![CDATA[<p>A few days back, NPR put out an article discussing why deepfakes aren&#8217;t +all that powerful in spreading disinformation. +<a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/05/07/851689645/why-fake-video-audio-may-not-be-as-powerful-in-spreading-disinformation-as-feare">Link to article</a>.</p> + +<p>According to the article:</p> + +<blockquote> + <p>&#8220;We&#8217;ve already passed the stage at which they would have been most + effective,&#8221; said Keir Giles, a Russia specialist with the Conflict + Studies Research Centre in the United Kingdom. &#8220;They&#8217;re the dog that + never barked.&#8221;</p> +</blockquote> + +<p>I agree. This might be the case when it comes to Russian influence. +There are simpler, more cost-effective ways to conduct <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Active_measures">active +measures</a>, like memes. +Besides, America already has the infrastructure in place to combat +influence ops, and have been doing so for a while now. </p> + +<p>However, there are certain demographics whose governments may not have +the capability to identify and perform damage control when +a disinformation campaign hits, let alone deepfakes. An example of this +demographic: India.</p> + +<h2 id="the-indian-landscape">the Indian landscape</h2> + +<p>The disinformation problem in India is way more sophisticated, and +harder to combat than in the West. There are a couple of reasons for +this:</p> + +<ul> +<li>The infrastructure for fake news already exists: WhatsApp</li> +<li>Fact checking media in 22 different languages is non-trivial</li> +</ul> + +<p>India has had a long-standing problem with misinformation. The 2019 +elections, the recent CAA controversy and even more recently&#8212;the +coronavirus. In some cases, it has even lead to +<a href="https://www.npr.org/2018/07/18/629731693/fake-news-turns-deadly-in-india">mob violence</a>.</p> + +<p>All of this shows that the populace is easily influenced, and deepfakes +are only going to simplify this. What&#8217;s worse is explaining to a rural +crowd that something like a deepfake can exist&#8212;comprehension and +adoption of technology has always been slow in India, and can be +attributed to socio-economic factors. </p> + +<p>There also exists a majority of the population that&#8217;s already been +influenced to a certain degree: the right wing. A deepfake of a Muslim +leader trashing Hinduism will be eaten up instantly. They are inclined +to believe it is true, by virtue of prior influence and given the +present circumstances.</p> + +<h2 id="countering-deepfakes">countering deepfakes</h2> + +<p>The thing about deepfakes is the tech to spot them already exists. In +fact, some can even be eyeballed. Deepfake imagery tends to have weird +artifacting, which can be noticed upon closer inspection. Deepfake +videos, of people specifically, blink / move weirdly. The problem at +hand, however, is the general public cannot be expected to notice these +at a quick glance, and the task of proving a fake is left to researchers +and fact checkers.</p> + +<p>Further, India does not have the infrastructure to combat deepfakes at +scale. By the time a research group / think tank catches wind of it, the +damage is likely already done. Besides, disseminating contradictory +information, i.e. &#8220;this video is fake&#8221;, is also a task of its own. +Public opinion has already been swayed, and the brain dislikes +contradictions.</p> + +<h2 id="why-havent-we-seen-it-yet">why haven&#8217;t we seen it yet?</h2> + +<p>Creating a deepfake isn&#8217;t trivial. Rather, creating a <em>convincing</em> one +isn&#8217;t. I would also assume that most political propaganda outlets are +just large social media operations. They lack the technical prowess and +/ or the funding to produce a deepfake. This doesn&#8217;t mean they can&#8217;t +ever. </p> + +<p>It goes without saying, but this post isn&#8217;t specific to India. I&#8217;d say +other countries with a similar socio-economic status are in a similar +predicament. Don&#8217;t write off deepfakes as a non-issue just because +America did.</p> +]]></description><link>https://icyphox.sh/blog/efficacy-deepfakes</link><pubDate>Mon, 11 May 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://icyphox.sh/blog/efficacy-deepfakes</guid></item><item><title>Simplicity (mostly) guarantees security</title><description><![CDATA[<p>Although it is a very comfy one, it&#8217;s not just an aesthetic. Simplicity and minimalism, in technology, is great for security too. I say &#8220;mostly&#8221; in the title because human error cannot be discounted, and nothing is perfect. However, the simpler your tech stack is, it is inherentely more
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+--- +date: '2020-05-11' +subtitle: 'Can we really write it off as "not a threat"?' +title: The efficacy of deepfakes +url: 'efficacy-deepfakes' +--- + +A few days back, NPR put out an article discussing why deepfakes aren't +all that powerful in spreading disinformation. [Link to +article](https://www.npr.org/2020/05/07/851689645/why-fake-video-audio-may-not-be-as-powerful-in-spreading-disinformation-as-feare). + +According to the article: + +> "We've already passed the stage at which they would have been most +> effective," said Keir Giles, a Russia specialist with the Conflict +> Studies Research Centre in the United Kingdom. "They're the dog that +> never barked." + +I agree. This might be the case when it comes to Russian influence. +There are simpler, more cost-effective ways to conduct [active +measures](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Active_measures), like memes. +Besides, America already has the infrastructure in place to combat +influence ops, and have been doing so for a while now. + +However, there are certain demographics whose governments may not have +the capability to identify and perform damage control when a +disinformation campaign hits, let alone deepfakes. An example of this +demographic: India. + +the Indian landscape +-------------------- + +The disinformation problem in India is way more sophisticated, and +harder to combat than in the West. There are a couple of reasons for +this: + +- The infrastructure for fake news already exists: WhatsApp +- Fact checking media in 22 different languages is non-trivial + +India has had a long-standing problem with misinformation. The 2019 +elections, the recent CAA controversy and even more recently---the +coronavirus. In some cases, it has even lead to [mob +violence](https://www.npr.org/2018/07/18/629731693/fake-news-turns-deadly-in-india). + +All of this shows that the populace is easily influenced, and deepfakes +are only going to simplify this. What's worse is explaining to a rural +crowd that something like a deepfake can exist---comprehension and +adoption of technology has always been slow in India, and can be +attributed to socio-economic factors. + +There also exists a majority of the population that's already been +influenced to a certain degree: the right wing. A deepfake of a Muslim +leader trashing Hinduism will be eaten up instantly. They are inclined +to believe it is true, by virtue of prior influence and given the +present circumstances. + +countering deepfakes +-------------------- + +The thing about deepfakes is the tech to spot them already exists. In +fact, some can even be eyeballed. Deepfake imagery tends to have weird +artifacting, which can be noticed upon closer inspection. Deepfake +videos, of people specifically, blink / move weirdly. The problem at +hand, however, is the general public cannot be expected to notice these +at a quick glance, and the task of proving a fake is left to researchers +and fact checkers. + +Further, India does not have the infrastructure to combat deepfakes at +scale. By the time a research group / think tank catches wind of it, the +damage is likely already done. Besides, disseminating contradictory +information, i.e. "this video is fake", is also a task of its own. +Public opinion has already been swayed, and the brain dislikes +contradictions. + +why haven't we seen it yet? +--------------------------- + +Creating a deepfake isn't trivial. Rather, creating a *convincing* one +isn't. I would also assume that most political propaganda outlets are +just large social media operations. They lack the technical prowess and +/ or the funding to produce a deepfake. This doesn't mean they can't +ever. + +It goes without saying, but this post isn't specific to India. I'd say +other countries with a similar socio-economic status are in a similar +predicament. Don't write off deepfakes as a non-issue just because +America did.